UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

* Case No. 13-CV-03569(FB) JEFFREY McEARCHEN,

Brooklyn, New York May 7 2011 Plaintiff,

May 7, 2014

V.

URBAN OUTFITTERS, INC.,

Defendant.

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TRANSCRIPT OF CIVIL CAUSE FOR TELEPHONE CONFERENCE BEFORE THE HONORABLE JAMES ORENSTEIN UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

APPEARANCES:

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             (Proceedings commenced at 10:07 a.m.)
                  THE COURT: Good morning, everybody. It's Judge
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       Orenstein. Sorry to keep you waiting.
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                  We're on the record in McEarchen against Urban
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       Outfitters, 13-CV-3569.
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                  Counsel, would you state your appearances, please.
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       Let's start with the plaintiffs.
                  MR. LESSER: Good morning, Your Honor. This is Seth
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       Lesser of Klafter Olsen & Lesser, and from other locations, I
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       have several of my co-counsel. Why don't you jump in? Susan?
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                 MS. STERN: Sure. Susan Stern from the Shavitz Law
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       Group.
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                  THE COURT: Good morning.
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                  MR. LESSER: Charlie?
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                  MR. GERSHBAUM: Charles Gershbaum from Hepworth,
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       Gershbaum and Roth.
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                  THE COURT: I'm sorry . I didn't -- oh, Mr.
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        Gershbaum. Okay. Yes.
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                  MR. GERSHBAUM: Yes. Good morning, Judge.
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                  THE COURT: All right. So the three of you for the
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       plaintiffs. Anyone else for the plaintiffs?
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             (No response.)
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                  THE COURT: Okay. For the defendants?
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                  MR. BARTON: Good morning, Your Honor. This is Tom
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       Barton, from Drinker Biddle and Reath, and with me is Bill
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Horwitz, also from Drinker Biddle and Reath, on behalf of Urban Outfitters.

THE COURT: Okay. Good morning.

All right, everybody.

So I have -- there are two open issues. There's the question of the depositions and then there's the notice to potential opt-in plaintiffs on which you submitted some supplemental letters yesterday. So I'd like to address both of them today.

I'm happy to go in either order, if anyone has a preference. If not, let's start with the depositions.

And Mr. Barton, maybe I could start with you on this one. If I've missed this, forgive me, but I don't think in your response to the motion you addressed the possibility of conducting depositions by video conference.

MR. BARTON: We didn't, Your Honor. Our preference would be to do them in person, but we certainly would consider and talk to the plaintiff's counsel about doing them by video.

THE COURT: Yes, why don't you just do that. I mean, look. We want to lessen the burdens as much as possible, and I don't want anybody to have to travel unnecessarily, but particularly in a case like this where the people we're talking about, the deponents we're talking about, are not people who chose this forum.

They decided to allow their claims to be litigated

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in a forum where similar claims were already being litigated.

You know, I think the solitary goal of the statute is promoted if we make sure that those people get a chance to participate in a litigation without having to assume burdens that they may not be able to afford.

So if we could do that by virtue of a video conference, I think that solves everybody's problem. But if anybody has a problem with that, let me know.

MR. BARTON: Your Honor, the only thing that I would then need to consider is whether I travel to them. Because I would like to be face-to-face, if possible. I understand what you're saying about reducing the burden on the plaintiff.

THE COURT: But it's also on you. And that's why I'm suggesting video conference.

Look, if you're willing to travel out to them, I think that's great. I was a litigator myself and I certainly understand the value of the face-to-face confrontation.

And if you're willing to go out there, I would encourage it. But I don't want to force that on you if you want to reduce costs as well. And that's why I'm suggesting video conference.

MR. BARTON: Understood.

THE COURT: But in any event, I'm not going to require the out-of-state opt-in plaintiffs to come to New York. All right?

Case 1:13-cv-03569-RRM-JO Document 83 Filed 06/05/14 Page 6 of 20 PageID #: 624 6 1 MR. BARTON: Understood. 2 THE COURT: So I quess to some extent that's -- that 3 goes in favor of what the plaintiffs are seeking, but really what I'm asking you to do is to work this out. 4 I'm going to deem the motion, if not withdrawn, at 5 least premature because I don't know that you've had a chance 6 7 yet to fully work this out among yourselves. 8 But that's my view is that the opt-ins from out of state don't travel. Mr. Barton, you're certainly free to go to 9 10 them, but I'm also happy to have it done by video to save 11 costs for you. 12 Anything else that anyone wants to say on -- oh, I'm 13 sorry. That leaves open on the first -- on this motion the 14 question of duration. 15 I generally hesitate to put a durational limit on 16 depositions in advance. I like the idea -- and forgive me. I 17 forgot who floated it first of doing one or two, seeing how it 18 goes and then we'll all be better informed about how these 19 things should proceed. 20 But -- and again, Mr. Barton, let me turn to you.

Do you anticipate having more than a couple of hours -- a couple three hours of questions to ask opt-in plaintiffs?

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MR. BARTON: Well, first of all, Your Honor, I will not waste anybody's time. I'm not interested in doing that. And I will do the depositions as efficiently as possible.

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I believe that after we take one or two we'll know exactly where we're going and we'll be able to do the depositions in well less than seven hours.

But from the outset I don't want to sort of tie myself, tie my hands before I know how these are going to go. Sometimes plaintiffs are not necessarily responsive to the questions. Sometimes we go into different areas.

So I just want the opportunity to take a few and if plaintiff's counsel thinks I'm overdoing it, or wasting people's times, which I don't think they will, then I think we can talk about that after we do a couple.

THE COURT: Yes. Look. And even during the first one if anybody thinks that the other side is being dilatory, you give me a call.

But I really do hesitate to try to put limits on it in advance. I won't hesitate to do it post hoc with respect to future depositions, if I'm persuaded that one side or the other is being dilatory.

But let me ask the plaintiff's counsel, one of the issues you raise on your side is that these are people who face the prospect of spending a long time in a deposition.

They're losing money.

Given that it's their employer on the other side of the table, would that problem disappear if the time that they spend at the deposition is considered work time and they're

8 1 getting paid for it? 2 MR. LESSER: Your Honor, this is Mr. Lesser. 3 is usually not a problem with the individuals who are current 4 employees. 5 THE COURT: Right. MR. LESSER: The difficulty in these cases, the real 6 7 difficulty in these cases is for the former employees. 8 THE COURT: I get that. 9 Usually are more likely to join the MR. LESSER: 10 cases because people, particularly at this level of companies 11 and retail chains like this, are very, very, very wary about 12 bringing an FLSA case. 13 Remember from both these people -- not that -- it's 14 not -- it's a not a life changing lawsuit. 15 THE COURT: Okay. So look. I get what you're 16 saying. 17 Try and work it out among yourselves and be 18 sensitive to the ideas, specifically with respect to former 19 employees who won't be paid for this time, to make it as 20 efficient as possible. 21 If there's a particular individual here and there 22 who you think it's a real hardship because they're going to 23 lose their job if they're out for more than three hours, or 24 there's some real hardship like that in an individual case, 25 obviously, you'll let me know and if you can't work it out on

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On the larger issue, Mr. Barton, perhaps I could ask you to clarify. You seem to be saying that it's not enough to go on just what's in the complaint and it's not enough to go on the fact that you have -- that you believe everybody's exempt.

But as I think I made clear at the initial conference, that's not at all my concern and it's basically that there doesn't seem to be any fact pertinent to the question of whether there is a violation of the wage laws that renders members of the punitive collective different from one another.

And at that conference we went through facts that you agree they share in common.

So I don't see why do I need affidavits or some other evidence to supplement the evidence, the affirmative evidence provided by the admissions of the defendant by way of what you said at the initial conference?

MR. BARTON: Well, Judge, thanks for the opportunity to talk to about this issue again. You know, I remember our discussion at that initial conference. I'll try to be brief.

THE COURT: Yes, but let me just make sure we're on the same page. You agree that what you said there is evidence, right?

MR. BARTON: Well, I agree my representations to

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        the court are binding on me and they're evidence.
                  THE COURT: Right. Okay. So it's not --
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                 MR. BARTON:
                               I think I --
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                  THE COURT: Wait, wait. So we're clear, that
        any decision I make is not, can't be based solely on
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        allegations in the complaint because the evidentiary record is
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       undisputedly broader than that, correct?
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                 MR. BARTON:
                              Well, I don't know, Your Honor. Maybe
        I'm not being clear as to what I'm saying to you.
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                  And so if I could just take another shot at it --
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                  THE COURT: You could, but you have already said
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        something that is part of the evidentiary record and I'm
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        trying to make sure that I'm not missing something about that.
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                  You don't disagree, do you, that what you said at
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        the initial conference is part of the evidence on which I can
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        rely.
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                               I agree with Your Honor.
                 MR. BARTON:
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                  THE COURT: Okay. Good. So go ahead. If you want
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to supplement it, if you want to add more evidence to the record, go ahead.

MR. BARTON: I will, Your Honor.

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We do not believe that these employees are similarly situated and for the reasons I think I talked about last time we believe, number one, you're talking about a group of department managers who hold very, very different jobs.

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You have women's accessory managers, men's department managers, houseware department managers. They do very different things.

And even within the individual locations, they have very, very different scope of job duties. Some of them are managing the entire store for long, long periods of time.

They have different responsibilities for the cash registers in terms of depositing funds, for instructing employees about shift changes and assignments.

These employees in the very, very different departments and very, very different locations at Urban Outfitters have very, very different job duties.

And there are cases in the Second Circuit that talk about the variations within a particular person's job duties as is not being similar situations.

In addition, Your Honor, we intend --

THE COURT: May I ask -- I'm sorry to interrupt, but I have a question about what you just said.

MR. BARTON: Sure.

THE COURT: This is a question I tried to ask multiple times last time. I think I understood your answer, but now you're -- I think you're trying to maybe give a different answer.

Of the dissimilarities that you're talking about in general --

MR. BARTON: Right.

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THE COURT: -- without having it in this instance given any specific examples, would any of them have the potential to render one member of the punitive collective covered by the FLSA and the other not? And if so, give an example.

MR. BARTON: I don't know and I don't quite understand your question, Your Honor. I apologize.

THE COURT: All right. You're saying we treat them all the same but they're actually different. And the question is not whether they're different -- whether -- you know, some of them work in different stores. Some of them have different hours. I get that.

The question is are they different with respect to the claim at issue.

So I'm asking you, is there any difference that you can cite among these workers, these department managers, that would result in the court being able to say well, this one is covered, but that one is not?

MR. BARTON: I don't think so. I mean, our position is that they're all exempt. And to that extent, Your Honor, you're correct. There is a single legal issue as to whether they're exempt or not, but that's true of every alleged misclassification case.

Every misclassification case starts with the premise

that the employer has treated them as exempt and the plaintiffs are arguing they're not exempt.

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Within those misclassification cases the question becomes as to whether they're similarly situated to each other, as to whether their job duties vary among the stores and among individuals and among the different departments and whether the damage calculations are going to be individualized such that they're not similarly situated and they shouldn't be treated for class purposes.

And the burden is on the plaintiff to prove that with evidence, not just with allegations, and our point is we haven't gotten there.

THE COURT: Once again, Mr. Baron, you're saying without evidence and allegations. We have evidence. You have provided it, have you not?

MR. BARTON: I don't think so, Your Honor. I think what I'm providing --

THE COURT: Have provided some evidence. You don't agree with the significance of it. I understand that. And I'm not asking you to concede it.

But I must make sure that you're not back tracking on something that I thought we had clarified, which is the record before me in making this decision is simply not limited to the allegations in the complaint.

There is, in fact, affirmative evidence in there.

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You may not think it supports the finding necessary for dissemination of a collective action notice, but there is evidence, correct?

MR. BARTON: I don't think there's evidence supporting it. What I've just said I believe is a representation to Your Honor that these individuals are not similarly situated. And I think that's where our minds are not meeting.

THE COURT: Okay. Who wants to speak for the plaintiff on this?

MR. LESSER: I can do so, Your Honor. This is Mr. Lesser.

Essentially, two points. What I think Mr. Barton really wars with the governing standards in this circuit, at least in actually most circuits, but not all, which is the Hertz standard of what needs to be shown.

And what was put on the record on the 31st of January, and we cited it at page 5 of our brief, and it went farther poking into some of the things -- touching upon some of the things you just -- that have just been fought through. That is evidence and those are admissions and that's what's looked at.

All these other arguments that, in fact, they do different things day by day and the like the second stage merits inquiry. We cited a decision by Judge Bianco, I

believe.

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The new argument today, to turn to it, of there have slightly different subgrades within this exempt classification is actually addressed head on by -- it wasn't addressed previously, but is addressed head on, if you wish to look at it, Your Honor, in a case we cite on page 2 of our letter to you from February 7th.

And that's about two thirds of the way down there's a cite to a case called ${\it Cunningham\ v\ EDS}$, Electronic Data Systems Corp.

And that was a case that we had -- that I had before Judge Howell in which we actually had 18 different job classifications at issue.

And we didn't actually even have plaintiffs for all of those classifications. They were actually -- they fell into three families.

And what Judge Howell pointed out, and in fact he says in that decision, although subdivision -- that's essentially what Mr. Barton's arguing. That there are these -- within this one classification there are really these subdivisions.

Judge Howell wrote "Although subdivision is simply done at the second stage of litigation." So in other words, if it makes a difference within this one category of department managers that they have these subdivisions, that's

the merit second stage and that's where it's normally heard.

There he actually created three over broad -- three classes, because there's actually three families. There's only one family equivalent here.

And at least in this circuit, there's Cunningham, that's the same issue that actually rose in one or two of the other cases we cited to Your Honor, including the HMS Host case, where there were, in fact, one class and, in fact, we're now going -- three different groups of the HMS Host assistant manager's. We actually went all the say through the litigation. Those three differences didn't make a difference.

We now have motions -- competing motions for final certification, de-certification sitting down the -- I guess upstairs from you.

And so I respectfully submit all these issues go around and all these arguments go around to the second stage, the admissions, the statements on the record, we submit, for the reason we put in our letter and I'm resubmitting and arguing it now, is sufficient and we shouldn't need to spend any more time gilding the lily, as it were, with anything more.

THE COURT: All right. Well, look. I think the record is clear in the way the case -- the applicable case law applies to it is clear.

The allegations in the complaint are supplemented by

evidence in the form of an admission by the defendant that the district -- the department managers, as you hear -- and I'm quoting now from Mr. Barton the last time.

"They're responsible for opening the store. They're responsible for all the employees in the store. They spend large periods of time serving the role a manager on duty, which means they are the top supervisor in the store. There is no store manager there. There is no assistant store manager there. So they're not just responsible for their own individual department.

They have significant responsibilities around increasing sales and directing the employees, training the employees, disciplining the employees, conducting performance reviews, hiring and there's a whole range of duties that they perform."

And just skipping onto the next page. That was page 11. This is page 12 of the transcript from January 31st.

"They vary from department manager to department manager, store to store, but all of them do have a very high level of responsibility within the store."

And then I asked, "Is there any fact that discovery would produce that would satisfy you that there's somewhere covered by the FLSA, even though others who share all of the characteristics, I guess I should phrase it this way, is it your position that you might learn facts in

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discovery that would say notwithstanding all of the attributes you just told me about there are some department managers who are nevertheless covered by the FLSA."

And Mr. Barton's answer was "I'd be very, very surprised based on my having done the initial investigation and having worked with this client for years."

There's more in the transcript along the same vein, but the burden of it is this. The defendant acknowledges that these district -- department managers are similarly situated with respect to the duties that render them exempt or non-exempt.

Therefore, the record suffices -- without the need for further factual development, the record suffices to demonstrate that the punitive class is similarly situated and that a notice should issue.

I'll ask you folks to get together and give me a proposed notice within two weeks.

Anything else for today, folks?

MR. BARTON: No, Judge. Thank you. This is Tom Barton.

THE COURT: Mr. Lesser?

MR. LESSER: Nothing else.

THE COURT: Thank you, all.

MR. LESSER: I'm sorry. Nothing else for plaintiff.

THE COURT: Do we have a date for our next